Abstract
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Standard version of the prisoner's dilemma game
86
The symmetric prisoner's dilemma game is a game involving two players, 
where the payoff entries satisfy the inequalities π a > π c > π d > π b .
90
The scheme of possible results of payoffs is as follows. If player I decides to advantage of the situation and obtaining the maximum benefit π a .
98
Technically, we say that mutual defection is the Nash equilibrium of this 99 game because there is no unilateral deviation that could make the deviating player 100 earn more, while mutual cooperation is the Pareto optimal situation. Therefore, defect, both of them generate a total payoff of 2 × π d , which is by definition lower 107 than the aggregate payoff if both of them coordinated in full cooperation, 2 × π c .
108
The standard version of the prisoner's dilemma game is a one-shot strategic strategy, both actions become public and the payoffs are generated.
113
Each player reacts to his own belief or expectation on the opponent's intention, 114 and as a consequence, the preferred action in the dilemma crucially depends on 115 the way players form their beliefs about the opponent moves. Therefore, it is 116 important to understand how beliefs and preferences do (or do not) influence each 117 other in this decision-making process. show the game tree of the game played in this sequential experiment (b), and each task is performed and this allows to measure different correlations between 145 actions (which are supposed to proxy the preferences of the players) and beliefs.
146
We now briefly explain the three different treatments, which are also summarized 147 in In the remaining of Section 3, we illustrate the basic mechanics of quantum-215 like toy models designed to address the issue of measurement as well as construct 216 different building blocks that will be fully developed later. As the reader will see,
217
Section 4 integrates them in a unified model. Now, we only show which aspects 218 of quantum-like modeling can account for the empirical effects observed in the 219 data set, without taking into account how they correlate to form the proper model. 
239
We consider the beliefs as the distribution with which the agents judge as this, together with one's own actions, determines the outcome of the game.
243
These beliefs are also represented by a set of mutually orthogonal vectors {|B j },
244
with the index j running from 0 to 9. 
The probability p(C II ) of the player choosing to cooperate is therefore:
with The probability of observing an outcome is calculated as the square of the norm of the projection of the state vector onto the subspace spanned by the vectors representing the outcome. When the outcome is represented by only one vector (simplest case), this calculation reduces to the square of the inner product of the state vector and the outcome vector. The act of measurement changes the state vector of the system from an initial state to a post-measurement state, by projecting (and normalizing) the state vector onto the subspace spanned by the outcome vectors. Projective measurements deal naturally with incompatible measurements, and note also that when they are performed on a density matrix diagonal in a particular basis, they are equivalent to Bayesian updates. probability of the player defecting as second mover is:
with we can estimate these through our sample as:
Note that we estimate by taking the average cooperation rates across the 266 treatments, because we have justified above that they are not significantly different 267 from one another.
268
We can model the choice of the players for their action as player I in the
269
Baseline condition in a Hilbert space H I ≡ R 2 , with the basis {|C I , |D I }. The 270 state vector is now
and we can infer from the data ( Table 2 , column 1) that
In this case, we only consider the cooperation and defection rates in the Baseline #Cooperators (Belief) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Abs. frequency (out of 60 subjects) 5 2 5 5 12 9 9 6 4 3 
From the data regarding the Elicit Beliefs treatment (see Table 3 ), we get that Table 2 ). projector and probability associated with a player defecting on the role of I, but
355
cooperating on the role of II is
The projector and probability associated with the player cooperating on the second 358 move (without specifying a choice as player I), are: 
and
Directly from the data (for the Baseline treatment), we derive 
379
The act of measuring still changes the superposition of the state vector, projecting 380 and normalizing it onto the relevant subspace.
381
In summary, the relationship between the belief and action measurement is
382
represented by the description of the action subspaces in terms of the belief basis.
383
In such setting, the consensus effect would be represented by the form of the 5- beliefs, the projectors onto these vectors will also have a new form: 
with i = 0, 1, . . . 9.
451
To incorporate a measurement with non-orthogonal outcome vectors, we will 452 go beyond the basic procedure of quantum measurement as done in Section 3.2.
453
To do so, we present two options, one favoring quantum theoretic consistency and 
465
In short, when using the POVM framework, the measurement outcome is still
466
represented by an outcome vector and its associated projector. If an outcome is 467 observed, the state vector is still projected onto the relevant subspace; however, 468 the probability of obtaining this outcome is calculated slightly differently. Assume 469 that the player is represented by a state vector |S , the probability of the player 470 thinking that i opponents have cooperated is now:
This form deviates from the probabilities derived in section 3.2 only in the factor 472 9 j=0 B j |S 2 . This extra factor finds root in the fact that the projectors P j forming 473 a POVM need to adhere to completeness: factor. This makes sure that the total sum of probabilities does sum to one, after 486 the standard quantum measurement (calculating probabilities and projecting the 487 state vector) is done. This scaling factor is defined as:
making the probability of eliciting belief i, given the state vector |S :
It is vital to note that the end result of both approaches is identical. We have 490 ten outcome vectors, representing the ten possible beliefs, in a two dimensional
491
Hilbert Space H B . The probability of eliciting the belief that i opponents have 492 cooperated, given the state vector |S is: between |C II and |B 9 as β SM (see Figure 4 ) and derive estimated probabilities 507 for a player replying that he thinks i opponents cooperate, after the player has 508 cooperated or defected on his second move. As such, this models the consensus 509 effect. We expect β SM to be close to 0, as the consensus effect tells us that people 510 who cooperate are more likely to assume that opponents cooperate as well.
511
Now we can derive the estimated probabilities for the beliefs of a player defecting on his second move (making the state vector |S = |D II ):
and for the beliefs of a player cooperating on his second move (making the state 514 vector |S = |C II ):
with i ∈ {0, . . . , 9}.
516
Similarly, we define H I,B as 2-dimensional with both a first move action basis 517 and a belief basis, with β FM the angle between |C SM and |B 9 . Once again, we 518 assume β FM close to zero, as players who explicitly think that their opponent will 519 defect are assumed to be more likely to defect as well. We can now derive the 520 estimated probabilities of a player cooperating or defecting on his first moves, 
The first and second moves are still considered to be compatible, allowing
526
for a tensoring of their respective Hilbert spaces to represent their correlation.
527
The projectors and probabilities associated with these measurements are identical 
Fitting the data
539
We fit the experimental data of the three measurements to our model. Note that set, so we will focus on minimizing this statistic.
550
Let us first focus on the two contingency tables representing the dependencies 551 of the beliefs on the second moves (see Tables 4 and 5 ). When a specific value of 552 β SM is provided, we can estimate the expected probabilities P(B i |D) and P(B i |C)
553 based on equations (23) and (25), respectively, and subsequently evaluate a chi- proportions on the α = 0.05 level indicates an acceptable fit. As this p-value is 587 estimated using simulation, the degrees of freedom are not taken into account, 588 unlike a traditional (asymptotic) p-value where the chi-square distribution is used.
589
As such, this p-value does not take into account that 20 proportions are estimated 590 using only one free parameter, making our estimated p-value even more favorable 591 to accepting the null hypothesis than the value suggests at first sight. See Tables 4   592 and 5.
593
When we aim to establish an optimal value of β FM for modeling the first move need to focus on the data counts and proportions for the cooperators P(C|B i ).
598
Similar to the beliefs of the second moves, we establish an optimal value of 599 β FM for the first move cooperators by minimizing the sum of the ten chi-squared Figure 3 ) explain the observed relationship between both experimental variables with a probit regression, obtaining a similar dependency. Nevertheless, our analytical curve has a deeper meaning because the functional form (equation 27) is a direct consequence of the geometrical structure of the POVM model.
Discussion
Our decision to abandon the restriction that outcome vectors coming from one 609 measurement are orthogonal to each other has consequences. The most important 610 one is the loss of the repeatability of outcomes. 
699
As not all vectors associated with outcomes of the belief measurement were 
